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Abstract:  Beginning mainly with the “cognitive revolution” in psychology in the latter half of the 
20th century, psychological science has been committing “suicide” slowly via linguistic muddling. 
Peña-Guzmán’s target article is but one of thousands of cuts contributing to this death by 
“suicide.” Having said that, given the current state of affairs in animal cognition research, there is 
much to commend in Peña-Guzmán’s article. I leave that to others, however. This commentary 
explains how the suicide by muddling of psychological science is happening in general, with the 
understanding that it applies also to Peña-Guzmán’s target article. 
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Background. For a discussion of the mythical cognitive revolution in American psychology, see 
Leahey (1992). For a discussion of linguistic muddling, see Bateson (1972/2000; especially his 
Introduction and Part I: Metalogues). For a discussion of the false Idols that obstruct clear thinking 
and, hence, result in muddling, see Bacon’s Novum organum (1620/1911). In Bacon’s “Idols of the 
Marketplace,” he warned against the fallibilities of language and explained how they are a barrier 
to clear thinking.  
 
How linguistic muddling happens. For 30 years, I taught “Neuroanatomy for Behavioral 
Scientists” at the graduate level, mostly but not always alternating textbooks between the most 
current editions of Alf Brodal’s (or his successor’s) Neurological anatomy or Malcolm B. 
Carpenter’s (who sometimes had coauthors and eventually a successor) Human neuroanatomy. 
From this experience and many additional resources, I have concluded that all central nervous 
system (CNS) processing reduces to three fundamental and continually interacting categories: 
sensory processing, effector (some might prefer “motor”) processing, and memory processing. 
Associated with each are physicochemical changes in the CNS, where the changes at one instant 
in time may interact and alter changes in the next instant of time.  




There are no isomorphic CNS physicochemical substrates for any of the concepts used by 
psychological scientists or, in Peña-Guzmán’s case, philosophers. Concepts such as “suicide,” 
“intelligence,” “creativity,” “love,” “hate,” fear,” “anxiety,” “stress,” ad nauseam are merely 
fictional tag-alongs borrowed from folk psychology or common language — or invented to avoid 
the tedious and never-ending task of identifying the relevant external antecedent and consequent 
events that must be observed to infer their potential explanatory usefulness and to define them. 
Antecedents and consequents might also be observed internally in the CNS via electrical, 
chemical, and other manipulations using methods such as stimulation, ablation, and recording. 
About neural activity monitoring such as functional MRI’s, magnetoencephalography, etcetera to 
identify brain functions, I am inclined to agree with Uttal (2003) who referred to such findings as 
“The new phrenology.” In his more recent book, Uttal (2012) made an even stronger case  
Any definition of such tag-along concepts (see list above) is inherently incomplete. 
Because such concepts have no specific physicochemical substrates, they are fictitious; that is, 
they are not materially real; and that is where muddling arises. Many “cognitive” concepts are 
reified by their users; they are often misused as representing, for example, causes or effects. For 
a specific example, one can cite articles in respected academic journals where researchers used 
“stress” variously as both a cause and an effect associated with one observable behavior or 
another.  
An animal cannot commit “suicide” because “suicide” exists as an inherently and 
incompletely defined concept. At the very least, when one uses a “cognitive” concept for any 
purpose, one should acknowledge its inherent limitations and let that be the guide to how one 
should use it. 
A diagrammatic representation of the general argument here appears below (Figure 
1). Similar diagrams might be constructed for any “cognitive” concept used by philosophers or 
psychological scientists.  
 
 
 Figure 1. A representation of the brain and its three fundamental, material-based sensory (open arrow), 
memory, and effector (filled arrow) processes. These processes are affected by material antecedent events, 
and they interact to determine material consequent events. The tag-along linking concepts used to describe 
such events are fictional (i.e., immaterial) adaptations from common language or inventions that are 
definable only in reference to the aforementioned material processes.  
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